Chapter Four

THE NEW DEAL LIFTS UNIONS

> It is one of the characteristics of a free and democratic nation that it have free and independent labor unions.
>
> —Franklin Delano Roosevelt

From World War I through the 1920s, the American labor movement struggled mightily. It was buffeted not only by a resurgence in the strength of big business, which remained hostile to unions, but also by a wave of political conservatism that cast a cloud of suspicion over the beliefs and actions of labor organizers. The problems of organized labor deepened with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. This terrible multi-year economic collapse triggered severe levels of unemployment and wage cuts across virtually all industry sectors. In the mid-1930s, however, the so-called "New Deal" policies of President Franklin D. Roosevelt provided important assistance to workers and made it much easier for unions to establish themselves and grow. The New Deal, in fact, laid the groundwork for several decades of tremendous union growth in America.

Organized Labor during World War I

When the great powers of Europe took up arms against each other in 1914 in the conflict that came to be known as World War I, the United States tried to stay neutral. America insisted that it did not want to take the side of either the Allied nations, which were led by Great Britain, or the Central Powers, dominated by Germany. In 1917, though, a series of German submarine attacks on American ships convinced the United States to join forces with Great Britain and declare war against Germany.

During World War I "Big Bill" Haywood and dozens of other Wobbly leaders were convicted of violating the 1917 Espionage Act. Haywood fled to Russia after his conviction, and he remained there for the rest of his life.

American labor divided down the middle over this decision to enter the war. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) vowed to support the war effort. Its membership even promised that it would not undertake any strikes or other activities that might disrupt U.S. industrial activities in wartime. This stance brought praise from American business executives, newspaper editorials, and lawmakers, and it has also been credited with boosting AFL membership during the war years. But labor groups with strong Socialist, pacifist, or Communist elements loudly condemned the decision to enter the war. Organizations like the Socialist Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) charged that the war was needlessly throwing away the lives of soldiers—many of whom were poor workers—to benefit industrialists who profited from the bloodshed.

When American soldiers began going overseas to fight, the Wobblies and a number of other left-wing unions who opposed U.S. participation in the war became the targets of violence and repression. They were attacked as unpatriotic and traitorous in newspaper editorials and Congressional speeches, and some war critics within the labor movement even came under physical attack. One leading IWW critic of the war, Frank Little, was even dragged out of a Montana jail cell and lynched by vigilantes for his antiwar views.

This backlash against left-wing political beliefs became even more severe in October 1917, when a bloody political revolution swept across Russia and displaced the dictatorial monarchy that had long existed there. The so-called Russian Revolution placed Bolsheviks atop the Russian government. Under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, the Bolsheviks installed a fiercely Communist regime that regarded America's political and economic systems with outspoken contempt.

With public opinion on its side, the administration of President Woodrow Wilson moved to crush the IWW radicals. In June 1917 the United States passed the Espionage Act into law, making it illegal for anyone to interfere with the war effort or military recruitment. Later amendments to the Espionage Act, most notably the 1918 Sedition Act, even made it illegal for American citizens to harshly criticize the U.S. government during wartime.

In September 1917 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raided nearly fifty IWW meeting halls across the country. Agents arrested 165 IWW leaders for conspiring to interfere with America's military draft, encouraging desertion from the army, and other acts of "sabotage" against the war effort. More than 100 activists were eventually put on trial, including William "Big Bill" Haywood. All were found guilty and sentenced to heavy fines and federal prison terms of ten to twenty years. When Haywood managed to gain a temporary release from custody on bail, he fled to Russia, where he lived until his death.

By the end of 1918, the Espionage Act was being openly used to target anarchists, Socialists, pacifists, and Communists within the labor movement. Notable radicals like Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were deported under the act, and Socialist legend Eugene Debs received a ten-year prison sentence for speaking out against the war. Imprisoned on April 13, 1919, he actually ran for president from his jail cell a year later. On Christmas Day 1921 his sentence was commuted by President Warren G. Harding and he was released from prison.

The Great Strike of 1919

World War I ended with an Allied victory in November 1918. Once the war ended, unions that had promised not to make any fuss about wages and working conditions during the conflict issued demands for improved benefits from employers—many of which had reaped huge profits from wartime orders. Many labor leaders focused particular attention on the eight-hour workday, which remained a fantasy in many major industries. Indeed, workers in steel mills, oil fields, canneries, and transportation industries commonly worked twelve-hour days—and many of them worked seven days a week as well. "The very workers most in need of a strong union to demand shorter hours are often too exhausted at night to attend meetings," complained Grace Hutchins, a Communist labor activist.[1]

A labor leader addresses a crowd of striking steel workers in Gary, Indiana, during the Great Strike of 1919.

When these calls for higher wages and shorter workweeks were rejected, some of the nation's largest industries—including shipping, coal, steel, and textiles—were roiled by massive strike actions. The impact of these strikes was greatly increased by the participation of the American Federation of Labor, which accounted for more than three out of four union members in America by 1920. Most of the strikes ended in complete defeat for the AFL and its fellow unions, however. One reason for their defeat was the presence in industrial cities of large numbers of African Americans who had fled the South in search of a better life. This additional source of cheap labor greatly reduced union leverage to squeeze better wages and working conditions out of employers.

An even greater factor in the union losses of 1919, though, was the so-called Red Scare. During this period of American history, fears about treacherous "reds"—Communists who wanted to bring down the nation from within—were widespread. Big business owners and their allies in government and the news media capitalized on these concerns by portraying *all* striking workers as dangerous radicals who threatened the American way of life. They also insinuated that since many strikers were recent immigrants, they were not "real" Americans.

These accusations deeply angered the great majority of striking workers. They argued that they were loyal Americans who were taking principled stands against corporate greed and social injustice on behalf of their families and their fellow laborers. But the efforts to persuade fellow Americans of the justness of their cause fell short, and without popular support their strikes and boycotts were doomed. It took many years for the labor movement to recover from the disappointments of 1919.

Corporate Paternalism in the Roaring Twenties

The labor movement's downturn in strength and vitality lasted for more than a decade. During the course of the 1920s the number of American workers in unions fell by over 1.6 million members.[2] In the meantime, pro-management and anti-union politicians took the reins of American government. To men like President Calvin Coolidge, who famously said that "the chief business of America *is* business," the needs and desires of American corporations were of the highest priority. This environment made it next to impossible for unions to make gains, either in size or influence. Instead, they spent much of their time and energy simply defending the small wage increases and other gains they had made in earlier decades.

Nonetheless, the condition of some American workers did improve somewhat during the "Roaring Twenties," a nickname given to the decade by affluent Americans who enjoyed the era's colorful and exuberant music, art, and culture. During this period, some large corporations showed an increased willingness to voluntarily approve small wage hikes, reduce workweeks, extend health and recreational benefits, or provide other benefits to employees. Many of these initiatives, sometimes called welfare capitalism or corporate paternalism, placed employers in the role of parental authority figures—and the workers in the role of children dependent on the kindness and wisdom of their elders. For example, several leading companies offered language and citizenship classes to immigrant workers, while others imposed strict guidelines of worker behavior that extended to their home lives. The Ford Motor Company, the largest automobile maker in the world, even created a Sociological Department that sent field agents to workers' homes to monitor them for cleanliness and order.

The growth in welfare capitalism was not generally driven by the warm and sympathetic feelings of business owners toward their workers. Rather, it was fueled by a desire to attract the most talented workers and by evolving ideas about business productivity and efficiency. Most notably, some employers became convinced that rates of worker absenteeism and disability could be greatly reduced if employees did not have to work such long hours. Major steelmakers, for example, voluntarily cut the hours of many of their exhausted workers—a move that also had the benefit of creating a demand for new workers who could fill those extra hours.

> ***"We began it as an experiment, but we shall probably keep the five day week permanently," said Henry Ford in 1922. "The men are better off with two days a week of complete rest."***

The best known example of a voluntary diminishment of work hours, though, came from the Ford Motor Company. In the late 1910s company founder and president Henry Ford began looking into using a five-day workweek in his factories and offices. "We began it as an experiment, but we shall probably keep the five day week permanently," Ford explained in 1922. "We thought that in the present labor situation we should be performing a service if we employed a larger force of men over five days rather than a smaller force over six days—provided, of course, we could do so without increasing our costs and therefore the cost to the public.… The men are better off with two days a week of complete rest, and we think that we shall be able to make the five day week permanent."[3] In 1926 this policy became official throughout the company.

Despite such high-profile initiatives, though, most employers remained reluctant to reduce hours. They did not see any reason to change the profitable status quo, in which workers labored ten or twelve hours a day, six or seven days a week. Some of these large corporations sought to deflect criticism of their stance by pointing out the various programs of welfare capitalism they provided to their workers. But since these benefits were not regulated or mandated by the government, the companies were of course free to end the benefits whenever they chose. So when the hard times of the Great Depression rolled over America and the world in 1929, corporations were quick to pull the plug on many of these programs.

The Great Depression brought crushing levels of unemployment to cities throughout the United States. This image shows unemployed workers in Detroit lined up at a charity bread line.

Labor Conditions in the Great Depression

The Great Depression was the most devastating economic collapse in the history of the United States. It began with the stock market crash of October 1929, which exposed dreadful weaknesses in the nation's banking and financial systems. From that point forward, the American people—and people in many other nations as well—endured years of incredible economic hardship. The worst years were the early 1930s, but the Depression did not fully pass away until the early 1940s, when America's involvement in World War II spurred huge increases in governmental military spending that revitalized industry and created millions of new jobs.

The economic downturn happened with terrifying speed as well. When the Great Depression first began, fewer than one million Americans were out of work. By January 1930, however, the number of unemployed had passed four million. By the end of that year, more than ten million Americans were without jobs. In March 1932 the jobless count stood at twelve million, and by January 1933 more than fourteen million Americans could not find jobs. In March 1933—the month that Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt succeeded pro-business Republican Herbert Hoover as president of the United States—the number of unemployed workers across the United States had surpassed fifteen million.[4] The situation was even more dire for African Americans, who even in good times were typically "last to be hired, first to be fired" by white employers.

As unemployment soared, so too did levels of hunger and homelessness. The desperate situation eroded longstanding convictions among America's working class that hard work could bring a brighter future for themselves and their families. "Workers who once believed in the American myth of success, who dreamed of inching up the occupational ladder, acquiring property of their own, and watching their children do even better occupationally and materially, had their hopes blasted by the Great Depression," wrote historian David Dubofsky.[5]

After Roosevelt took office, he promised to put the government to work to fight the nation's many problems. He did this through numerous programs and legislative acts designed to reduce unemployment, revitalize banks, and relieve the overall misery that had enveloped so many American families. As part of this so-called "New Deal," the Roosevelt administration also signaled its support for labor unions (see "America's First Female Secretary of Labor," p. 72). This attitude greatly alarmed big business owners, who launched a variety of efforts to keep the unionization at bay. Some companies harassed or fired union organizers. Others bluntly warned that they would replace workers who dared to organize.

Another popular tactic was to form "company unions"—organizations of workers that were actually founded and bankrolled by the companies themselves. Employers claimed that these company unions would give workers the means to negotiate with owners over wages, hours, and other workplace issues, just like regular labor unions. Labor activists condemned company unions as a blatant attempt to lure workers away from "real" unions, but corporations worked very hard to sell the company union concept to their workers. One Pennsylvania steelworker recalled that the company he worked for "called us together and said, 'We're going to get big-hearted now.' … And the company was very lavish with the money. Oh, they were lavish. They put on some of the most beautiful picnics you ever saw. They spent up to ten thousand dollars. They brought nationally known, prominent bands and comedians here. They gave the kids all the pop and soda and hotdogs they wanted. They brought in all kinds of rides and concessions. They went all out! In other words, they spent unlimited money to keep the union out."[6]

Unionization and the National Industrial Recovery Act

The early centerpiece of Roosevelt's New Deal job creation efforts was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Signed into law by Roosevelt on June 16, 1933, the NIRA created the Public Works Administration (PWA), an agency designed to put millions of unemployed Americans to work building highways, hospitals, schools, dams, and other infrastructure. The legislation also established the National Recovery Administration (NRA). The NRA established wage and competition guidelines for corporate America. In addition, it contained a provision—Section 7a—that guaranteed labor unions the right to organize and collectively bargain with employers.

Labor leaders seized on this opportunity to rebuild their long-suffering unions. Under the leadership of John L. Lewis, the United Mine Workers (UMW) managed to gain official recognition from a number of big coal companies, and before long UMW mines accounted for 90 percent of the country's soft coal production. Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Association (ACWA) used the Section 7a provision to double his union's membership by the close of 1933. The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), which was helmed by David Dubinsky, experienced an even greater jump in membership, from 40,000 workers to 200,000 workers.[7]

But many companies still refused to negotiate in good faith with labor representatives, in part because the NRA did not contain meaningful penalties for such behavior. Instead, numerous companies organized company unions. In the steel industry alone, for example, the number of company unions jumped from seven in 1932 to ninety in 1934.[8]

Mounting worker frustration with this situation resulted in a series of labor strikes in the summer of 1933. Roosevelt and his fellow New Dealers responded to this development, which threatened hopes of an economic recovery, by establishing a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB

America's First Female Secretary of Labor

Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins.

One of the most important New Dealers in the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt was Labor Secretary Fannie Coralie "Frances" Perkins, the first woman to be appointed to a cabinet position in the United States. Perkins was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on April 10, 1880. She spent her early career as a progressive social reformer in Chicago and New York. In 1918 she was appointed to the New York State Industrial Commission, where she worked on workplace safety issues. In 1929 Roosevelt, who was serving at that time as governor of New York, promoted Perkins to leadership of the Commission. When the Great Depression struck in late 1929, Roosevelt gave her a leading role in managing various relief programs across the state.

quickly moved to establish a set of regulations that would outlaw some of the anti-union actions of industry and strengthen collective bargaining rights. In the meantime, though, worker anger continued to escalate. In 1934 the nation was rocked by another wave of labor strikes, some of which spiraled into violence. The worst of these events occurred in Minneapolis, where repeated bloody clashes between striking members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and police (who were also supported by "deputies" paid by city trucking companies) forced Minnesota Governor Floyd Olson to place both Minneapolis and the neighboring city of St. Paul under martial law.

The Wagner Act

In 1935 the chaotic world of labor-management relations underwent another dramatic change. Frustrated by the continued difficulty of enforcing

When Roosevelt became president in 1933, he tapped Perkins to serve as his secretary of labor. A strong advocate for working Americans as well as the millions of Americans who had lost their jobs in the economic downturn, Perkins helped craft a variety of laws and programs to help these segments of the population, including the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act, the 1935 Social Security Act, and the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. In addition, Perkins's tenure as secretary of labor was marked by steadfast opposition to using federal or state troops to break up union-organized strikes.

Perkins enjoyed the trust and respect of Roosevelt throughout her years at the helm of the Labor Department, despite repeated conservative charges that she was a Communist sympathizer. She led the department for twelve years and did not step down until May 1945, one month after Roosevelt's death. One year later President Harry S. Truman appointed her to the Civil Service Commission, on which she served for the next seven years. In the 1950s she left government to take a faculty position at Cornell University. She died on May 14, 1965.

Sources:

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decisions made by the NLRB, lawmakers in Washington who supported union rights began discussing new ways to ensure labor's ability to organize and bargain collectively with employers. Then, in May 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a unanimous ruling that the National Industrial Recovery Act, which had created the NRA, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court decision paved the way for members of many service industries, like hotels and restaurants, to push for a return to twelve-hour workdays and seven-day weeks, which had faded away under NRA rules. This proved to be an unwise move, however, for progressive lawmakers became even more determined to pass labor-friendly legislation.

The leader of this Washington effort to strengthen labor rights was Democratic Senator Robert Wagner of New York. Wagner had been one of the lawmakers most responsible for putting labor standards into the 1933 NRA,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt (seated) signed numerous bills that were designed to reduce unemployment and bolster workers' rights. This photograph shows a signing ceremony for a 1933 unemployment bill crafted by Representative Theodore A. Peyser of New York (left) and Senator Robert Wagner of New York (right), and witnessed by Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins (center).

so when he saw the need for additional legislation he stepped up once again. "Running through all of Wagner's thinking was not just concern for social justice," explained historian Anthony Badger, "but also a conviction that the American economy could not operate at its fullest capacity unless mass purchasing power was guaranteed by government spending, welfare benefits, and the protection of workers' rights."[9]

Working with other concerned legislators and officials, Wagner crafted a new labor rights law, then pushed tirelessly for its passage (see "Laying the

Groundwork for the National Labor Relations Act," p. 180). He initially received little help in this effort from the Roosevelt administration. When it became clear that the legislation had enough votes for passage in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, however, Roosevelt became more enthusiastic about its potential impact. Roosevelt signed Wagner's National Labor Relations Act—popularly known as the Wagner Act—into law on July 5, 1935.

The Wagner Act was a tremendous victory for organized labor and worker rights. It expanded the powers of the National Labor Relations Board to oversee employee votes to unionize. This provision alone prevented companies from torpedoing such elections or ignoring their results. In addition, the act outlawed company unions and identified numerous unfair labor practices—including espionage, blacklisting, and discriminatory treatment of union members—that would no longer be permitted under U.S. law.

In the months following the signing of the Wagner Act, significant other pro-labor measures were signed into law as well. The Public Contracts Act of 1936, also known as the Walsh-Healey Act, required all companies doing work for the government worth $10,000 or more to establish a maximum eight-hour workday and forty-hour workweek for their employees. The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) prohibited "oppressive child labor," established minimum wage standards in many industries, and guaranteed "time and a half" pay for overtime for many types of jobs. Roosevelt summarized the FLSA as a law that would ensure that working Americans received "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work."

Rise of the CIO

This rapidly changing labor landscape provided America's largely nonunionized "industrial" workers—employees within the nation's mass-production industries—with a golden opportunity to organize. Up to this point in U.S. history, most of the strength of the American labor movement had been concentrated in craft unions—organizations of machinists, pipefitters, carpenters, and other workers with specialized skills. These unions were the foundation of the AFL, which had long dominated organized labor.

During the early 1930s AFL leaders like William Green had explored the idea of expanding into "industrial unionism," in which both skilled and unskilled workers within a company or industry would join together in a single union. After all, the majority of American workers *were* unskilled or semi-

John Lewis helped organize millions of industrial workers under the banner of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

skilled employees in mass-production industries like steelmaking and automobile manufacturing and service industries such as freight transport. John Lewis of the United Mine Workers, one of the few AFL unions with a largely unskilled workforce, also argued for a new emphasis on organizing workers in these industries. But other officials in the AFL worried that expansion into these areas would reduce the negotiating leverage of their existing members in the skilled trades, and so the AFL never really moved forward on the issue.

This stance angered and frustrated many industrial workers, who felt powerless and forgotten. "In the AFL in those days nobody seemed interested in us," recalled a worker who helped make refrigerators for General Electric. "They were only interested in skilled people: tool and die makers, carpenters, tinsmen, and the like. No one seemed interested in the semiskilled or the unskilled.… I mean, what about the common guy in the shop that runs a machine, or a sheet-metal man that runs shears, or a punch-press operator that sets up a press, or a man that repairs tools and dies and that kind of stuff?"[10]

Continued AFL inaction also infuriated Lewis, who believed that all workers would benefit if the labor movement could establish a strong presence in America's steel mills and automobile factories. In 1935 Lewis finally decided that if the AFL would not act, he would spearhead a drive for industrial unionism on his own. That November he established the Committee for Industrial Organizations (CIO), which became a major force in American business and industry within months of its founding. The CIO was technically part of the AFL at its outset, but strained relations resulted in the CIO's formal break from the older organization in 1938. It was at that time that the CIO changed its name to the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Taking full advantage of the protections contained in the Wagner Act and other New Deal legislation, the CIO organized workers in a vast array of industries with stunning speed. And since the ranks of mass-production workers it recruited were heavily populated with African Americans, Mexican Americans, white women, and immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, the federation of unions under the CIO umbrella became much more representative of the American population as a whole than the white male-dominated AFL had ever been.

The Flint Sit-Down Strike

The CIO's amazing growth was due in large part to several highly publicized clashes with employers that ended in victory for CIO unions. These included a successful 1936 strike by the United Rubber Workers against the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in Akron, Ohio, over poor working conditions, as well as collective bargaining agreements with corporate giants like U.S. Steel, RCA, and General Electric in the late 1930s.

The single greatest triumph, however, was undoubtedly the 1936-37 Flint Sit-Down Strike, which pitted the fledgling United Automobile Workers (UAW) against General Motors (GM), one of the most powerful corporations in the country. The UAW's chief goal was to force GM to recognize the UAW as the representative of its work force for collective bargaining purposes. To accomplish this, UAW organizers launched a "sit-down" strike on December 29, 1936, at one of GM's most important plants in Flint, Michigan. Unlike previous strikes that combined work stoppages and picketing, the strikers in Flint simply occupied a key facility that contained the dies for the automaker's 1937 car models. By seizing control of the plant and keeping management from retrieving the dies, the UAW effectively paralyzed the entire corporation's manufacturing operations.

Outraged GM executives promptly demanded that Michigan Governor Frank Murphy call in National Guard troops to evict the strikers. But Murphy, who was sympathetic to labor demands, refused to do so out of concern that such a move might trigger an outpouring of bloodshed. When Flint police launched a botched—and bloody—attempt to seize the plant, though,

A striking auto worker enjoys a brief reunion with his dog during the 1936-37 Flint Sit-Down Strike.

Murphy ordered troops to Flint to keep the peace and prevent another explosion of violence. The tense showdown continued for several more weeks, as GM tried unsuccessfully to get the courts to intervene. In the meantime, the UAW ferried food and other supplies to the sit-down strikers (who took control of another key facility in the plant in early February) and organized marches and other demonstrations of support.

The clash ended quietly on February 11, 1937, when Murphy negotiated a settlement between the two parties (see "Remembering the Flint Sit-Down Strike," p. 184). Under the agreement, GM formally recognized the UAW as the exclusive bargaining representative for General Motors employees who joined the union over the following six months. Lewis and the UAW rejoiced, for they knew that the terms would convince many non-UAW workers of the union's stability and strength. As they anticipated, membership in the UAW soared in the weeks following the settlement. More than 100,000 workers from General Motors alone joined the union, and the UAW's total membership jumped from fewer than 100,000 in February 1937 to more than 400,000 by the end of that summer.

Other UAW victories soon followed. The auto executives at Chrysler accepted the UAW as the official bargaining representative of their workers later in 1937, and in 1941 the UAW managed to unionize the fiercely anti-union Ford Motor Company after years of bitter conflict. To be sure, the CIO and its constituent unions were not always victorious during this time. In 1937, for example, a sit-down strike aimed at a group of smaller steel companies in the Midwest known collectively as "Little Steel" was soundly defeated. Nonetheless, the overall trend was toward unionization. From 1933 to 1941 the percentage of union workers in nonagricultural industries jumped from 11.5 percent to 28.5 percent, and by the end of World War II more than one-third of the American work force was unionized.[11] And for the first time in the twentieth century, the AFL relinquished its place as the largest federation of labor in the country. By the close of the 1930s the CIO's unionization of vast swaths of the auto, steel, rubber, and electric product industries—all of which were pillars of the U.S. economy—had enabled it to vault over the AFL and claim its place as the most influential union in the land.

Notes

1 Hutchins, Grace. *Labor and Silk.* New York: International Publishers, 1929, p. 120.

[2] Roediger, David R., and Philip S. Foner. *Our Own Time: A History of American Labor and the Working Day.* New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, p. 210.
[3] Interview with Samuel Crowther. "Ford's Four Production Principles." *Factory: The Magazine of Management,* July 1922, p. 15.
[4] Roediger, p. 243.
[5] Dubofsky, Melvyn. "Not So Radical Years." In Boris, Eileen, and Nelson Lichtenstein, eds. *Major Problems in the History of American Workers: Documents and Essays.* Lexington, MA: Heath, 1991, p. 376.
[6] Quoted in Bodnar, John. *Workers' World: Kinship, Community, and Protest in an Industrial Society, 1900-1940.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, p. 131.
[7] Badger, Anthony J. *The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940.* Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1989, p. 121.
[8] Badger, p. 119.
[9] Badger, p. 127.
[10] Quoted in Bodnar, p. 154.
[11] Barnard, John. *American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970.* Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004.